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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
VAUGHN L. W ARR, MARY ILEENE W ARR McKOWAN, ETHEL
\\rARR R E E D,
KATHERINE
Wi\RR HAMILTON and EMMA
W ARR HAMILTON,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
No. 7872
THE VAN KLEECK-BACON INVESTMENT COMPANY. and THE
VANKLEECK MORTGAGE COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants,

JA_Y

LARSEN,

Appellant and Intervener.

Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Early in the year 1920 The Van Kleeck Mortgage Company, a Colorado corporation, appointed an agent in the State
of Utah for the purpose of soliciting loans. The company
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at the time, however, did not qualify to do business in the
State of Utah ·or appoint any process agent. On April 22,
1920 The Van Kleeck Mortgage Company, while still· not
qualified to do business in the State of Utah, made a loan
to Joseph F. Warr and Elizabeth Warr, his wife, in the
amount of $2500.00 and took as security therefore a mortgage
on the property, which is the subject of this law suit. On the
19th day of April, 1921 the Warrs executed a Warranty Deed
on the property in favor of The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment
Company, a sister corporation of the Mortgage Company, also
a Colorado corporation. The Investment Company never acquired any interest in the note or mortgage, nor did it pay
to the Mortgage Company any consideration for any interest
in. the property covered by the mortgage, nor did .the Mortgage
Company ever attempt or purport to transfer to the Investment Company any interest which the Mortgage Company may
have had in said property by reason of the ·mortgage. Likewise, the Investment Company paid no consideration to the
\XTarrs for the deed.
~

1

Coincindentally with the signing of the deed to the Warrs,
The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company executed an agreement to reconvey the property to the W arrs upon the payment
to The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment_ Company of the sum
of $3500.00. The deed itself was recorded. The recqnveyance
agreement was not recorded-in fact, it contained a provision
that if it were recorded it should become null and void.
The Van Kleeck Mortgage Company qualified to do
business in the State of Utah on the 2nd day of May, 1921.
6
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~rhe

charters of both companies were revoked by the State of
Utah for the non-payment of license fees on the 20th day of
April, 1936, and the companies were not reinstated until
March, 19 51. By the terms of the corporate charters in the
office of the Secretary of State, the corporate life of both companies has long since expired. No amendments extending the
corporate life of either of these companies has ever been filed
\Yith the Secretary of State of the State of Utah.
On March 3, 1938 the Mortgage Company, as grantor,
executed a contract of sale to the surface rights of said property to· one Jay Larsen. In 1942 the Investment Company
executed a Warranty Deed to the surface to Jay Larsen. In
1951 the Investment Company executed a lease on the mineral
rights in favor of the Carter Oil-Company for the consideration
of $75,000.00.
Between 1921 and 1951 the two companies intermittently
had process agents appointed in the state, but during long
periods of time there were no process agents at all. In March
of 1951 these two companies jointly wrote to one Don Barr,
a resident of Vernal, Utah, asking if he would serve as process
agent. Barr wrote back that he would so serve. The companies
thereupon informed him that he was the process agent and
filed the necessary papers with the Secretary of State. However, they gave Don Barr no instructions of any nature whatsoever regarding his duties as progess agent, nor did they
subsequently communicate with him regarding what he should
do in the event process was served upon him.
On the 31st day of July, 1951, the plaintiffs served sum-
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mons :in this action on Don Barr as process. agent for the defendant companies (R. 4), having previously on the 27th
day of June·, 1951, filed the Complaint (R.3), and recorded
the Lis Pendens. No answer was ~ade in the time provided
by law. Default was entered August 21, 1951 (R. 38), and
on the 31st day of August, 1951, the plaintiffs adduced evi. dence and took Default Judgment (R. 5) in the action quieting title in them to the property as against The Van I(leeck
Mortgage .Company and The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment
Company-.
On the 20th day of November; 1951, the defendants,
The Van Kle~ck Mortgage Company and The Van KleeckBacon Investment Company, filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment (R. 9) on the grounds ((that the said. entry
of default and said default judgment were entered and taken
against the said defendants through and ·by reason of their
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable negledt." This
matter was argued before the Court on the 14th day of December, 1951 and on the 26th day of April, 1952 the Court
entered its ruling denying the motion to set aside the default
judgment (R. 31), which ruling was docketed on the 13th day
of May, 1952. On the 23rd day of May, 1952 the defendants
filed another motion to set aside the default judgment (R. 32)
on the grounds that there ·was a misjoinder of parties in that
the plaintiffs had failed to mal<:e the owner of the surface .
rights, Jay Larsen, a party defendant and also ~hat they had
failed . to make Carter Oil Company a party defendant. On
the same day, Jay Larsen filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment and for permission to intervene in the action· (R.
8
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39). On the following day, May 24, 1952, The Van KleeckBacon Investment Company filed a motion to have the court
reconsider and set aside its ruling (R. 44) denying the defendants' n1otion to set aside the default judgment on the
grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. These matters were argued before the Court. During
argument in open court, plaintiffs' counsel offered to give
to Jay Larsen a Quit Claim Deed from plaintiffs to the surface rights of all of the property concerned in this action
(R. 56) . Larsen was not present, nor was his attorney. He
\\·as being there represented by the same attorney representing the Van Kleeck companies, which attorney, on behalf of
Larsen, rejected the offer of a Quit Claim Deed. All of these
motions were denied (R. 5)) and from this denial the appeal
now before this Court has been taken. The particular facts
will be more fully disq~ssed in connection with the points
-to which applicable.
II

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE UNDER THE ORIGINAL MOTION.
II

THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT FOR
NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES SHOULD BE DENIED.

9
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III
JAy LARSEN SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO
INTERVENE.
IV
THE POSITION OF CARTER OIL COMPANY.
r

III
ARGUMENT
THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE UNDER THE ORIGINAL MOTION.

(a) The Default Did Not Result From Surprise, Inadvertence or Excusable Neglect.
The original motion filed by the defendants and all of
the argument directed thereto was based upon the ground that
the default of the defendant resulted from surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect, and therefore should be set aside
under the provisions of Rule 55 (c) and Rule 60 (b) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants appear to have practically abandoned this argument, devoting only a few pages
of their voluminous Brief to this matter. To insure that this
Court will have no doubt that the court below correctly denied
defendants' said motions, we propose to discuss the matter
fully.
The evidence in the record shows that the Summons was
properly served upon the process agent at. Vernal, Utah,
10
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which the defendants had designated, Mr. Don Barr. Barr
in his affidavit states that he had never received any instructions from the defendants as to his duties as process agent
and that at the time he was served, the fact that he was their
process agent had actually slipped his mind. Our statutes
specifically provide that answer to sununons shall be made in
20 days. If the default in this case were set aside on the
sho,ving made, it would mean that in every case, and certain! y
in every case concerning a non-resident corporation, the time
to answer would not be 20 days as the rule says, but 110
days-20 days plus the 90 days time in which to move to set
aside a default judgment. Such is certainly not the law.
One of the earliest cases in Utah touching this point concerns a non-resident corporation and is very much in line
\Vith the case now before the Court. This is the case of Walker
Bros. v. Continental Insurance Company of N.Y., 2 Utah 33i1.
In the Walker case, as in this case, summons was served on
the agent for a non-resident corporation. The agent in the
Walker case held the summons and did notping about it until
it was too late for the company to answer. The evidence showed
in the Walker case, as it shows in this case, that the company
had never informed its resident agent as to the procedure to
be followed if a summons were served. In the ·walker case,
as in this case, the non-resident agent aparently never did
read the summons to determine just what its nature was. The
·lower court refused to set aside the default judgment and
the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court.
In discussing the law, the court stated:
''There was no abuse of discretion, and the decision
11
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is fully jus!ied on the ground of negligence in the local
agent, in the general agent, and in the attorney of
appellant.
(tHe mailed the papers to New York City, knowing
an answer could not be drawn and received by mail
within the remaining nine days.
((It does not appear that he wrote, or that he informed
the appellant when service was made; or whether he
would or would not act in the matter; or that he even
read the summons; or knew when the answer vvrould
be due."
·
The Court further stated:
((The appellant urges that its agents made a mistake
in not deeming it his duty to protect appellant from
default and judgment, and made an inadvertence in
not promptly taking steps to prevent default and notifying appellant by telepgraph. There is nothing in
the affidavits to show that the agent had any instructions or authority from the appellant to protect its rights
in the manner specified, and he himself swears that he
was not authorized to employ counsel, and (could only
submit the papers to the company and await their
instructions.' He does not, therefore, appear to have
made any mistake or inadvertence. It was the mistake
and inadve~tence of the company, in not giving him
authority to act for the corporation in such cases. But
the mistake and inadvertence are not such as can be
relieved against''
Although this case is an old one, it is still very much in line
with the weight. of authority and has never been modified
by the Supreme Court of Utah.

12
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The only Utah case upon which defendants rely on this
point is the case of Utah Commercial _Bank v. Trumpow, 17
Utah 199, which is so far different from this case· on its facts
that it has no persuasive value. In the Trumbow case, the
default resulted from the fact that a notice given went astray
in the mails, and the Trumbow case holds, in line with the
great weight of authority, that the defendant is. not chargeable
with the failure of the United States mail and that failure
to answer resulting from failure of the mail service is excusable neglect. In this case if the process agent, Barr, had actually
mailed the papers to the defendants and the mails had failed
to deliver them, the case would have been in line with the Trurobow case. Such, however, is not the fact. Barr did not even
remember that he was process agent for the defendants and
paid no attention to the summons served upon him.
The California statute covering the setting aside of de- ·
fault judgments is very similar to ours and has been construed by the courts of that state in numerous cases. The following excerpt from the California Appellate Court in the .
case of Elms v. Elms, 164 P. (2d) 936, indicates the attitude
of the California courts whert the mistake or negligence is
deemed inexcusable:
((To warrant relief under section 473 a litigant's
neglect must have been such as might have been the
act of a reasonably prudent person under the same
circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the
statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify
relief. Freeman on Judgments, 4th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 482;
Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 483, 485, 39 P. 863.

13
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It is the duty of every party desiring to resist an action
or to participate in a judicial proceeding to take timely
and adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his
own person to avoid an undesirable judgment. Unless
in arranging for his defense he shows that he has
exercised such ·reasonable diligence as a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows upon important business his motion for relief under secion 473 will be
denied. Freeman, 483, 5th Ed. Courts neither act as
guardians for incompetent parties nor for those who
are grossly careless of their own affairs. All must be
governed by the rules in force, universally appliec;l
according to the showing made. Gillingham v. Lav.rrence, 11 Cal. App., 231, 232, 105 P. 584. The lavv
frowns upon setting aside default judgments resulting from inexcusable neglect of the complainant. The
only occasion for the application of Section 473 is
where a party is unexpectedly placed in a situation
to his injury without fault or negligence of his own
and against which ordinary neglect will .warrant judicial relief unless it may reasonably be classified as of the
excusable variety upon a sufficient showing. Hughes
v. Wright, 64 C·al. App. 2d 897, 149 P. (2d) 392."
In all of the following California cases, the trial court
actually set aside the default judgment and the appellate
court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in
so doing and reinstated the default judgments. In Sharman
v. Jorgensen, 39 Pac. 863, the attorney thought he had filed
the Answer, but inadvertently did not do so. In Durbow v.
Chesley, 141 P. 631, the defendant's attorney failed to file an
appearance due to a mistaken understanding that the action
was to be consolidated with other actions. In Ross v. San
Diego Glazed Cement Pipe Co., 194 Pac. 1059, the attorney
received the service of a cross-complaint and instructed his

14
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stenographer to place it in the files, but no further action was
taken.
In the follo,ving California cases, the lower court refused
to set aside the default judgment and was sustained by the
appellate court. In the case of Shay v. Chicago Clock Co.,
44: Pac. 23 7, the court stated the facts as follows:
ttThe president read the papers that day, and observed their date, but, without making any inquiry
as to the time when they were served, kept them in
his possession until after the default had been entered.
He stated, at the hearing of the motion, that he did
not send for his attorney, or send the papers to him,
but kept them, thinking that his attorney would be in
every day, and therefore waited until he should come,
and that, when he did see him, the default had been
entered.''
In Coleman v. Rankin, 37 Calif. 247, the defendant received a copy of the summons while in attendance as a witness
in court and placed it in his _hat and lost it. In Williams v.
Cummings, 30 Pac. 762, the attorney incorrectly marked the
date of service of summons and was late in filing_ his answer.
In the case of Cleek v. Virginia Gold Mining & Milling
Company, 122 P. (2d) 232, the Supreme Court of the State
of Idaho set aside an order of the lower court vacating a default judgment using the following language:
(While the granting or refusing to grant a motion
to vacate a judgment and set aside a default, where
right to relief is based on the claim that they have
been permitted to be taken and entered through mist

15
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1

take, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, is
a matter which rests largely in the discretion of the
trial judge, reference is· always had in stating that rule
to a sound, judicial reviewable discretion, in the
exercise of which courts must bear in mind a judgment is property of which the owner must not be deprived without due process of law, and the mistake
or neglect, to be sufficient, must be such as may be
expected on the part of a reasonably prudent person
situated as was the party against whom the judgment
was entered. Kynaston v. Thorpe, 29 Idaho 302,
158 P. 792; Valley State Bank v. Post Falls, etc., 29
Idaho 587, 161 P. 242; Green v. Craney, 32 Idaho
338, 182 P. 582." See, also, Dormer v. Stone, 27 Idaho
279, 149 P. 505; Nelson v. McGoldrick Lumber Co.,
30 Idaho 451, 165 P. 1125; Savage v. Stokes, 54 Idaho
109, 28 P. (2d) 900; Voellmack v. Northwestern
M. L. Ins. Co.,. 60 Idaho 412, 92 P. {2d) 1076.
Again the California Courts, in the case of Weinberger
v. Manning, 123 P. (2d) 531, held that the burden of proof
of establishing that neglect ~as excusable was on the defendant. In refusing to set aside a default judgment, the court
stated:
nThe first question for determination under the
cited section is whether or not there was a mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect on the
part of defendant. If ther~ was not then she is not
entitled to relief, notwithstanding any showing of
merits (in support of her motion.' Bond v. Karma-Ajax
Consol. Min Co., 15 Cal. App. 469, 472, 115 P. 254.
The burden of proof in such a matter is upon the
defendant and she was required to establish her claim
of ·excusable neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. Bruskey v.' Bruskey, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 472,
41 P. (2d) .203. While courts are generous in reliev16
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ing litigants of their defaults resulting from inadvertence or excusable neglect yet they are not required
to act as guardians for persons who are grossly careless as to their own affairs. Gillingham v. Lawrence,
11 Cal. App. 231, 233; 105 P. 584. All persons in
possesion of their normal facilities, capable of engaging in busines transactions must conform with, and
be guided by, the rules and regulations of legal procedure. Ibid. While the decision upon a motion to
open a default is primarily within the discretion of
the trial court, at the same time such discretion rnay
not be exercised arbitrarily; it must be an (impartial
discretion guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed
legal principles.' Brill v. Fox, 211 Cal. 739, 297 P.
25, 26."
The following enlightening language is found in the
case of Bickerstaff v. Harmonica Fire Ins. Co., 133 S.W. 2d
890 @ 892:
the case last cited the court said: (The statute
to vacate judgments by this proceeding is in derogation, not only of the common law, but of the very important policy of holding judgments final after the
close of the term. Citizens must have some confidence
in the judgments of our official ·tribunals, as settlements of their controversies, and there should be some
end of them. Unless a case be clearly within the spirit
· and policy of the act, the judgment should not be disturbed'.''
t]n

In the case of Bond v. W. T. Congleton Co., 129 S.W.
2d 570 @ 573, the court stated:
"However, this liberal attitude has never been extended to the point o( declaring that a party is enttiled to have a default judgment set aside as a matter

17
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of right. It is only when he shows a reasonable excuse
and establishes that he has not been guilty of unreasonable delay or neglect that the discretion of the
trial court should be exercised in setting aside a default judgment and permiting defense to be made."
In the case of Lynch v. Arizona Enterprise Mining Co.,
179 Pac. 956 @ 95 7, the service was made on a non-resident
agent who failed to notify his principal. Default was taken
and the lower court set the default aside. The supreme court
of Arizona reversed the lower court and reinstated the default judgment using the following language:
((Can the negligence of the statutory agent in not
notifying the defendant of the pendency of the suit
because (he did not know the address of the company'
be considered (excusable neglect'? We think not. It
must be conceded that it was the duty of the agent
to promptly forward the summons to the proper officers of the company. There is no showing that he
made any effort to ascertain the address of any of
the defendant's officers. Nothing of that nature is
disclosed. It appears that the principal works of the
company ate situated at or near Boise, in the adjoining
county, to the one in which the agent resides. Furthermore, the statute requires that the articles. of incorporation organized under the laws of this state shall
contain (the names, residences, post office addresses
of the corporators, the name of the corporation, ~nd
its principal place of business.' Civ. Code 1913, par.
2100. These articles are required to be filed in the
office of · the Arizona Corporation Commission. It is
too plain to be questioned that, if the agent had made
any reasonable effort to discover the address of a!ly
officer of the company, he would have succeeded, and
it must be held that he was cupably negligent in not
18
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doing so, and that his negligence was the defendant's
negligence."
In the recent case of Postal Benefit Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
165 Pac. (2d) 173·, the Arizona courts went even further. In
that case, summons \Yas served on the corporation commission
of Arizona, which by statute was made the process agent for
the non-resident corporation in question. The corporation
commission failed to notify the defendant of the p~ndency
of the suit and a default judgment was taken. The lower court
refused to set the default aside and the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the lower court. The language of the
Arizona Supreme Court is as follows:
((We are committed to the rule that where service
had been made on a duly appointed statutory agent,
and the agent failed to notify his principal, through
mere carelessness, that such a showing does not constitute (excusable neglect but was indeed inexcusable
neglect.' Lynch v. Arizona Enterprise Min~ C'O., 20
Ariz. 250, 179 P. 956. We believe the majority of the
cases support this view. 31 Am. Jur. 287, Sec. 747,
Judgments. If the statutory agent here was one by
appointment, rather than by law,. we would be impelled to follow the Lynch case. We see no reason to
adopt a different rule where the agent has been made
so by law rather than by appointment Under the law,
the defendant actually appointed each member of the
commission as its agent. Unless, therefore, th~ showing made disclosed that the agents were excusable
in failing to advise defendant of the summons, the
court properly denied the application to set aside the
judgment. The record is barren of any legal excuse
on the part of the commission. It appears that the
summons was placed in the files of the commission,
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.

'

and nothing further done about it. This is no justifiable
excuse or neglect. Lynch v. Arizona Enterprise Co.,
supra; Gutierrez v. Romero, 24 Ariz. 382, .210 P.
470; Garden Dev. Co. v. Carlow, 33 Ariz. 232, 263,
P. 623, 625; Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Ellis,
53 Okl. 264, 156 P. 226, L.R.A. 1916E, 100; Gordon
v. Harbolt, Cal .App. 280 P. 701; Larson v. Zabroski,
21 Wash. (2d) '572, 152, P. 2d 154 rehearing 155 P.
2d 184."
In the case of Penn Central Light & Power Co. v. Central
Eastern Power Co., 171 A. 332 @ 335, the defendant failed
to answer and cited the failure of its process agent to bring
the service of summons to its attention as a basis to set aside
the default judgment taken. The court refused to set aside the
default judgment ·and quoted in support of its refusal Freeman
on Judgments. The language of -the Pennsylvania Court is
as follows:
((The defendant is a citizen of the State of Delaware.
The statute requires it to have a resident agent upon
whom process may b~ served. It appointed such agent.
Service upon the resident agent is as complete and
valid as if the service had been made upon the President or other head officer.
~~To

hold otherwise .would be to destroy the effect
and meaning of section 48 of the Corporation Law
(as amended by 34 Del. Laws, c. 112, Sec. 12).
((It would be the same, if the defendant were a foreign
corporation and service of process •had been made
upon its statutory agent. 1 Freeman on Judgments,
Sec. 346."
In Freeman on Judgments, Vol. 3, Sec. 1204, in treating
of equitable relief, it is said:
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((Consequently even an inequitable judgment will
not be set aside nor will its enforcement be enjoined
''rhere it was the result of the complaining party's
fault or inexcusable neglect. To entitle a party to relief,
he must not only show the fraud, mistake or other
ground for equitable interference, but it must appear
that he \Yas not negligent in failing to discover the
real facts in time to prevent the judgment. This principle of diligence is as applicable to a party's agent
and representative in the action as to the party himself. Thus, a judgment against an infant will not be
set aside merely because of the neglect of his guardian
ad litem "rhere there was no fraudulent or collusive
act by the plaintiff. The same ·is true with respect to
the neglect of a trustee of a school district. And the
failure of a corporate agent upon whom service was
legally made to inform the executive officers of the
defendant of the fact, because of his unwarranted
assumption that the service was ineffective, is negligence which defeats relief."
The same rule prevails in the Federal Court. In Traveler's
Protective Assn. v. Gilbert (C.C.A.) 11 F. 269, 275, 55
L.R.A. 538, summons was served on the secretary of the
corporation. The secretary of the corporation informed the
marsal that he, the secretary, was not the proper person to
be served, but that the marshal should s.erve the President
of the association. The secretary assumed that he, the marshal,
would follow his directions. The marshal did no such thing,
but filed the return on the basis of the service on the ·secretary. Default was taken. The appellate court refused to disturb the finding of the lower court that the default judgment
should not be vacated. The following is the language of the
appellate court:
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ccwe are also of the opinion that the misapprehension claimed to exist on the part of Secretary Bass was
not such as justified him in not infonning the proper
executive officers .of the pendency of the suit. Even
if he did think the Marshal would take his advice,
and serve some other person, he, with the/ copy of the
summons in his possession, was not justified in the
misapprehension claimed for him. He was clearly
negligent in not apprising his superior officers of the
service as made, and the association, being responsible for his negligence, cannot resort to a court of
eqt;tity for relief.~'
In the case of S. B. Reese Lumber Co. v. Licking Coal &
Lumber Co., 161 SW 1124 @ 1126, summons was served on
the statutory agent who failed to notify his principal. That
court -also refused to set aside the default judgmen-t. The
court stated in its opinion:
ccThough Cook's denial that such advice was given
to him by Nesbitt or that he made the reply attributed
to him by the latter; and that of appellant's vicepresident and manager, S. B. Reese, that notice of
the service of the summons was ever given appellant
by/Cook, be accepted as, the truth of ;the matter, it
would merely show that Cook was negligent in failing
to inform appellant of the service of the ·summons
upon him, and, this being so, appellant cannot rely
upon the negligence of its agent as gro~nd for vacating the judgment rendered against it after being properly summoned in this action. In such a state of case
the negligent of th agent is imputed to the. principal,
and is, therefore, the negligence of the latter. In
other words, the absence ·of actual knowledge . by
_appellant of the service of the summons upon its
agent of the pendency of the action, though it ·may
have prevented it from. making defense to the ac- 22
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tion, \Yas not such an unavoidable casualty or mis·
fortune in the meaning of sub-section 7, Sec. 518
Civil Code, as entitles it to a vacation of the judgment
or a new trial. Beasley et al v. Furr, 154 Ky. 286, 157
s.w. 10."
In the case of San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.
(2d) 651 @ 653, the appellate court again upheld the discretion of the trial court in refusing to set aside a default judgment. The following excerpt is taken from the appellate
court's decision:
((The question of setting aside a default judgment
is a matter within the discretion of the trial court,
and, unless that discretion has been clearly abused,
\vhich is not the case here, an appellate court is not
authorized to disturb the judgment. It is also settled
law that, where one seeks to set aside a default judg. ment because of failure to ans.wer and defend the suit,
he must show that neither he nor his agents were negligent in that regard, and that, where defendant f~ils
to show a reasonable excuse for not answering the
suit in time, it is immaterial that he alleges a meritorious defense thereto. Hooser v. Wolfe (Tex. Civ.
App.)- 30 S.W. (2d) 728; Homuth v. Williams (Tex.
Civ. App.) 42 S.W. ( 2d) 1048, and cases there cited.
The failure of Newton to inform appellant, his employer, of the service of citation upon him until August
28, 1931, and in telling appellant that he was served
on that date, was negligence, and showed no reasonable excuse for not answering the suit in time, except
an excuse based upon the negligence of appellant's
agent and with which negligence appellant alone is
charged.''
The case of Wheat v. McNeil, 295 P. 102, although it

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

does not go directly to the negligence of a process agent,
does go to the question of whether or not mere mistake on the
part of a person receiving the summons. is sufficient grounds
upon which to set aside a default judgment. In that case,
the person receiving the summons failed to take any action
because of the fact that he believed that it had to be served
by _a peace officer, when in fact it was served by a private individual. Default was taken and the Court refused to set it
aside. In upholding this decision the appellate court stated:
,

I

ttAs to the mistake, advertence, etc., alleged in the
complaint, and the fraud in relation thereto, the following excerpt from the complaint may be recited
as a complete answer to any grounds for relief: The
complaint uses the following language: tThat the
palintiff was at such time (referring to the service
of summons) , o_f the opinion and belief that such
summons and complaint, in order to be legal, had
to be served upon him by a sheriff or an officer of
the law; that at such time the plaintiff was not of
the opinion and belief that he had been actually and
legally served with a copy of the summons and complaint in said action, or in said action at all; that because of the aforesaid facts the plaintiff, through
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,
failed to employ the services of an attorney, and
refrained from making any legal defense to such
action, and suffered a default to be taken therein and
judgment rendered against h~m'. This, of course, constitutes no excuse whatever .. By his own pleading the
appellant in this case shows that the service of summons in the personal injury action, that is, the action
where judgment was .taken by default against the
appellant, was had in entire accord with the provisions
of sections
410 and 411 of the Code of Civil Pro,
cedure.
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A similar ruling was pronounced in the North Dakota
case of Foley v. Davis, 211 N W 818, where the defendant
failed to answer the summons because he believed it should
have been signed by the Clerk of the Cnurt instead of by an
attorney. The default was granted. A motion was filed to set
aside the default which was denied, and the appellate court
uDheld the deniaL
.&.

Additional cases where summons was served on a process
agent who failed to notify his principal and where the courts
refused to set aside the default judgment taken are:
·George 0. Richards Co. v. Scott (an Okla. case),
251 Pac. 482.
Bradshaw v. Des Moines Ins. Co. (an Iowa case),
134 N W 628.
n18-8-·5 Disability of Noncomplying Foreign Corporation.

(b) The defendants have no meritorious defense.
In order to have a default judgment set aside in addition
to showing that the same was taken as a result of surprise,
inadvertence or excusable neglect, it is necessary for the person
~oving to set aside the judgment also to show that he has a
meritorious defense. In the court below, the defendants took
the position that if the answer itself stated a defense, this
requirement of the statute was met. While this may have
been true under the old rules of pleading which required
great particularity, it certainly cannot be true under our present
Rules of Civil Procedure which allow the complaint and the
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answer to state the position of the party in a very general
way and then provide that it may be supplemented by depositions, written interrogatories and demands for admission. All
of these supplement the pleadings. It is the position of the
plaintiffs that whether there is a meritorious defense depends
upon the state of the record at the time of the hearing. The
plaintiffs in this case took the depositions of certain officers
of the defendant companies to supplement and explain the
allegations in the defendants' answer. These depositions
were before the lower court at the time this motion was argued
and therefore should have been, and undoubtedly were, considered by the court in connection with the argument. The
record is at the present time in such a state that- if the default
judgment were set aside, the plaintiffs could go into court and
move, and be entitled to, a summary judgment on the pleadings. Certainly when the record is in that condition, a mentorious defense is not shown.
Before discussing further the law of the case as it applies
to the merits, plaintiffs would like to call the attention of the
court to certain statements made by counsel for the defense
in their brief. Counsel stated that it would not be equitable
to set aside the default judgment because if the default judgment is allowed to stand, the defendants would lose the money
they advanced on the mortgage. This is not a good defense
as it will hereafter be pointed out because of the fact that
the mortgage has been released and was void in the first place.
However, the court might understandably be somewhat influenced if they felt that the defendants might sustain an outof-pocket loss if the judgment were sustained. That is a
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matter of equity. It is also a well established rule that one
·who seeks equity must do equity and that one coming into a
court of equity must come in with clean hands. The defendants admit that they have leased the surface rights of the
property and also that they have executed an oil lease with
Carter Oil Company. However, counsel for defendants refused
to let its witness Bray testify as to how much money they had
actually received from the property (p. 20). The defendants
steadfastly refused to reveal how much money they had received from Carter Oil Company for the lease until the final
argument before the court in June when counsel stated that
the amount was $75,000.00. Certainly on the basis of equity,
the defendants have been well repaid for the· $2500 which
they loaned on the void mortgage.
Section 18-8-1, U.C.A. 1943 requires every foreign corporation to file certain instruments, articles, by-laws, acceptance of Utah Constitution, ~~designation of some person residing in said county upon whom all legal process may be served."
18-8-2 requires the filing of ((each and every certificate of
amendment of its Articles of Incorporation." Section 18-8-5,
so far as it is pertinent, reads:
Any foreign corporation. doing business within
this state and failing to comply with the provisions of section 18-8-1 and 18-8-2 shall not be entitled
to the benefit of the laws of this state relating to
corporations and shall not sue . . . . and shall not
take, acquire, or hold title, possession or ownership
of property, real, personal or mixed, within this state;
and every contract, agreement and transaction whatsoever made or entered into by or on behalf of any
27
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such corporation within this state or to be executed or
performed within this state shall be wholly void on
behalf of such corporation and its assignees and every
person deriving any interest or title therefrom, but .
shall be valid and enforceable against such corporation, assignee and person; . . . ."
In our present matter the very essence of the Van Kleeck
operations was the lending of money and the investing in
properties for the sake of returns therefrom. The transcript
of the deposition of Ross Bray clearly sustains our position that
as of the time of the execution of the note and mortgage in
1920 by Joseph Warr and his wife, the VanKleeck Mortgage
Co. had already established in Utah at Vernal an agent for
the carrying on of its business. This agent· was authorized to
and did negotiate and consummate this particular mortgage
and carried on for many years thereafter in that .capacity. The
exact words of Ross Bray. in this respect as as follows (p. 15) :

nQ. Did you have a field agent out there?
A. We had a local agent in Vernal, Utah, whose name was
John Glenn.

Q. Would it be he thru whom these loans were made?
A. You mean the W arr loans?

Q. The Warr loans, yes.
A. Mr. Glenn prepared and forwarded the application
to the company fot the loan.
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Q. \\'as he at that time authorized to accept applications
for the company for loans in that area?
A. Yes, sir."
As this matter arose while the Compiled Laws of Utah
1917 "·ere in force, let us review what our Supreme Court has
said on the validity of such a note and mortgage.
Dunn v. Utah Serum Co., 238 Pac. 245. ·This is an action
involving the validity and foreclosing of a mortgage executed
by the Utah Serum Co. and a counter-claim and cross-complaint was raised in the litigation. The question came as to
whether or not the said company could maintain the said
cross-complaint that was filed by the Ft. Dodge Serum C'O.
This latter company is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the state of Iowa, which failed and neglected
to file copies of its Articles of Incorporation, its By-laws and
to appoint a resident agent for some 8 months after the date
of the transaction involved in this action. It was not until
April 16, 1923 that the said corporation qualified in Utah.
The case at page 250 quotes the sections of the Compiled Laws
of Utah, 1917 that are pertinent in our present litigation and
which are in sum and substance the same as the law now in
force, being section 18-8-1, 18-8-2 and 18-8-5 of the U.C.A.
1943.
In this Dunn case our Supreme Court carefully reviewed
the previous commitments relative to the matter of the foreign
corporation's contracts in Utah and then summarized the
la\v at page 2 51 as follows:
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ttThe rule to be deduced from the cases cited may
be stated thus: Where it is made to appear that any
foreign corporation, except an insurance corporation,
is doing business within this state within the meaning
of section 945, without having complied therewith,
every contract whatsoever made or entered into by
or on behalf of such corporation within this state, or
which is to be executed or performed within this state,
is wholly void on behalf of such corporation. This,
as I understand it, is the construction of the law which
the Court had in mind when speaking upon the subject
in the Parker case.
'' ( 4) The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked
to lift this appellant out of the difficulty in which it
finds itself. To hold that Dunn and T. D. Ryan are
estopped, because their mortgages recite that they
are given subject to this second mortgage, or that Dunn,
the two Ryans, and the Utah Serum Company are
estopped because they have received the benefits of
the money lent and have failed to repay or to return
the same, to plead and prove in this action, to which
they are parties and wherein their rights are involved,
the facts which show that appellant's contracts are
void and that it has no right to set them up as the
basis of a counterclaim or a cross-complaint would
be, in practical effect, to defeat the purpose and intention of the Legislature as manifested in the statute.
Such a result cannot be sanctioned by the courts."
A number of authorities are cited in support of this ruling
and those- that are a variance therewith -are distinguished by
the Court.
It is apparent that the Van Kleeck Mortgage corporation
had launched upon its planned course of business in Utah at
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the time the note and mortgage were executed by plaintiffs'
parents. It did not qualify in Utah for one year after the date
of execution of the note and mortgage.
. A recent Utah case construing this matter generally is
lvfarchant v. National Reserve Company of America, 103
Utah 530, 13l7 Pac. (2d) 331. Therein the state and federal
cases are discussed at length as to what constitutes ndoing business" in this state and holds in essence that a foreign corporation must be engaged in a continuous course of business rather
than· a few isolated transactions. There must be at least- some
permanence about the presence and business transaction~ of ,
the corporation within the state. We submit that the Van.
Kleeck operation, by its very existence in 1951 as requalified
corporations, is evidence enough of the permanence of its '
activities in Utah, coupled with· the provisions of its Articles
of Incorporation and its By~laws authorizing it to conduct a
. mortgage loan business in Colorado and elsewhere and to
invest in properties in C~lorado and elsewhere. The m?rtgage
at issue was negotiated and consummated through the agency
of Mr. Glenn at Vernal, Utah and certainly such were within
the scope, course and purpose of the corporation's avowed
intent. There is no requirement that we must ·show a course
of conduct in the state pr~or to this particular mortgage as
this was in the line of the purposes of the corporate operations subsequently carried on within the state of Utah. Mr.
_Bray testified on deposition that the company was actively
·engaged in business nuntil about 1930" and ((made a considerable number of loans'' (p. 9) ..
This court, therefore; should weigh· these m~tters in de-
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termining whether or not in the motion that has been filed
to set aside the default there is a substantial or meritorious
defense alleged by way of the proposed answer that has been
tendered. Another very essential fact to be considered by the
court it) conjunction with the proposed answer, is the effect
of the deed from the W arrs to the Investment Company that
has been referred to in the second defense. In this connection
let us point out that in the deposition (p. 17) there is a copy
of the agreement to reconvey the property back to ~he W arrs.
Our Supreme Court in line with the general rul~s of law relating to this matter has clearly and without equivocaton held
that the execution of a deed, apparently full, final ·and complet~ on its face, may be sho'Yn to be merely a mortgage by
evidence, either parol or in writing, of the existence of an
agreement to reconvey the property upon the happening of certain eyents. The primary purpose of such a holding is that
sharp dealings such as were engaged in by these two Van
Kleeck companies shall not preclude ordinary land owners
in Utah from the protection to which they are entitled to in
a mortgage transaction, including the right of foreclosure,
defense and redemption. The case which established this rule
ih Utah is Bybee v. Stuart, 189 Pac. (2d) 118-Weber County
-1948.
((A wararnty deed, absolute in form, was given by
Oni Stuart to Claude Stuart .. A concurrent agreement
was executed' providing that Claude Stuart would reconvey upon payment of mortgages. and taxes and
that he would convey to a purchaser if produced by
Onion like terms. This action is to compel conveyance
to such a third· party.''
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p. 122. n'W'here there is a written agreement between
the parties, contemporaneous with the deed, which
shows the deed was given for security purposes, the
court '"ill look to the real transaction and treat it as
a mortgage." See Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah. 568, 58
P. (2d) 24.
nit is not necessary that an instrument follow the
statutory form to be a valid mortgage. In equity, a
deed absolute on its face may be shown by parol
evidence to have been given for security purposes only.
Utah is recognized as a tlien theory' state. Our Supreme Court has held that a mortgage does not vest
title in the mortgagee but merely creates a lien in
his favor. Until there is a foreclosure of the mortgage
and sale no title vests in the mortgagee. The mortgagor ( Oni) retains title to the mortgaged lands
and all that is created in favor of the mortgagee is
a lien, a right to resort to the lands to satisfy a mortgage debt.
See: In re Reynolds estate, 90 Ut. 415, 62 Pac. (2d)
270.
See also: )Whitley v. DeVries et al, 209 Pac. (2d)
206."
·This premise having been definitely established, no force
is inherent in the claim of adverse possession that is apparently
asserted by the proposed answer. The only legal title in the
picture that the defendants could possibly assert is by virtue
of the deed in 1921 to the Investment Company. No cash or
other consideration was paid by the Investment Company to
the Warrs (p. 16). This deed has clearly been shown to be
only a mortgage and hance is not the basis for adverse possession and there never has been any step taken for the fore-

33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

closure of the mortgage nor for any sale of the land as required by the law of Utah. Let us consider in addition thereto
the very vital factors as to whether there could possibly be
any adverse possession by the Investment Company. The testimony of Mr. Ross Bray relative to t~e payment of taxes,
(which we all understand and know to be a vital factor in the
element of adverse possession) , shows that the taxes were
never paid by the Investment Company, but that payment was
made only by the Mortgage Company (p. 23) up until 1938,
when the Mortgage Company

~ntered

into a contract for the

sale of the surface rights to Jay Larsen and thereafter neither
company has paid any taxes whatsoever. Thereafter, to-wit,
on the 4th day of February, 1942, the Investment Company
gave. its Warranty Deed to said Larsen covering the surface
rights, but prior to said date it does not appear that the Investment Company ever exercised any claimed rights or did
not act to show that it claimed any right to possession of said
property. Another elemental factor in whether or not ad~
verse possession could accrue is the question of whether these
foreign corporations doing business in Utah were available
for suit by a resident within this state. The records· of the
county clerk's office show that the last appointment of a resi·
dent agent in Utah was in 1926 and none other until 1951
We are advised and can substantiate by evidence the fact that
the said resident agent appointed in 1926 left and departed
from the state of Utah in 1928 leaving both corporations
without resident agents and hence absolutely disqualified to
do business in Utah from the period from 1928 to 1951. Of
course, no adverse possession could be running in favor of
34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the non-qualified foreign corporation during the period of its
disqualification.
Reference has been made in our affidavit adverse to the
proposed motion to set aside the default, to the fact that the
corporate existence of both of these corporations that were
organized in Colorado has terminated and that no amendments
extending the life of said corporations has ever been filed with
the County Clerk of Uintah County or with the Secretary
of State of Utah. Particularly, the Investment Company is
standing upon the asserted title in its name. This corporation was formed in 1901, and for a period of 20 years.
Thus, its corporate existence expired in 1921 just a few months
after the taking of the purported deed which was in fact only
a mortgage. Again no adverse possession could be accruing
in favor of this Investment Company in light of its expired
existence since 1921.
A reading _of the proposed Answer and the numerous
purported defenses asserted- therein makes it obvious that_ the_
Mortgage Company certainly makes no claim whatsoever to an
ownership interest in the property at issue now before the
Court. We therefore submit that in any event no reversal
of the default could be made as to the Mortgage Company
because no defense has been asserted on its behalf as to an
ownership_ claim or interest in and to this property. It is
obvious that such is not _and could not be asserted because
of the fact that the abstract of title which was introduced as
Exhibit CCA" in the original proceedings before this -court
shows a conveyance, which is referred to in our affidavit now
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in file herein, by the Mortgage Company to Joseph F.

Yf arr

and his wife, Elizabeth W arr, fully satisfying and discharging
the purported mortgages that were claimed to be outstanding
and .co.nveying the right, title and interest of the Mortgage
Company back to the said Joseph F. Warr and Elizabeth Warr
and their h~irs and assigns forever.
From the foregoing it appears that the defendants were
clearly not entitled to have the default set aside either on the
basis of their original motion to set aside the same for surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect, or op. the basis of
the motion to reconsider that denial made on May 24th. In
this connection the attention of the Court is called to the
fact that the motion to reconsider the ruling was not filed until
11 days ~fter the docketing of the denial of the . motion.
Under the provisions of Rule 52 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which is the only provision for amendment of findings. and judgment that we are able to find, such a motion
must be made within 10 days. Therefore, any of the supplemental affidavits submitted in connection with this motion
to reconsider, if they had any probative value- which we
maintain they have not, should not be considered by the Court
for the reason that they were filed ~fter the time provided.
The motion to set aside the judgment on the grounds of surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect was. therefore properly
denied by the lower court. In fact, the facts are so clear that
not only did the lower court not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment, but would have abused its
discretion had it ordered such judgment set aside.
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THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT FOR
NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES SHOULD BE DENIED.

(a) The Motion Was Not Timely.
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the setting aside of judgments on certain stated
grounds. This rule provides that the motion must be made
within a reasonable time. On certain specific grounds it must
be made within three months from the date of the judgment.
In this case the default was enteretl on the 21st of August,
1951 and the judgment complained of was entered on the
31st day of August, 1951. The motion to set aside the judgment for mis-joinder of parties was not filed until the 23rd
day of May, 1952. According to their affidavit contained
in the file, the defendant companies learned of the entry of
judgment early in November of 1951. Thus the defendants
waited 9 months after the entry of judgment and 6 months
after they learned of the entry of judgment before filing
this motion. Certainly this cannot be construed to be a reasonable time and is clearly far in excess of the 3 months allowed
under certain designated grounds.
Constructive notice to all parties and interested persons
was had by the recording of the Lis Pendens herein on June
27, 1951.

(b) There Was No Mis-Joinder of Parties.
The plaintiffs are in agreement with the defendants that
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a mis-joinder of parties results where an indispensable party
is omitted·. However, it is clear from .the examination of the
facts in this case that neither Jay Larsen nor Carter Oil Company were necessary or indispensable parties to the action.
The defendants' position rests wholly upon the faulty premise
that there is privity of title in the defendants and Jay Larsen
and that any order defeating the defendants' title automatically
defeats the title of Jay Larsen. They have stated this position
numerous times in their bri~f as a basis for their vanous
arguments. For example on page 59, it is stated:
']t is, of course, clear in the case at bar that Jay
Larsen's title is founded upon the defendants' title.
A successful defense by Jay Larsen to the action would
necessarily demonstrate that there was no cause of
action against the defendants."
Such is certainly not the case. In order to have privity of title
not only must two parties claim through the same source,
but their title must rest upon the same basis. Jay Larsen claims
only the surface rights and the Van Kleecks claim only the oil,
gas and mineral rights.. In this case it is true t~at both the
defendants' title and Jay Larsen's title depend upon the deed
from the Warrs to Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company.
Jay Larsen, however, stands in an entirely different position
in regard to this deed than do the defendants. The deed
was apparently fair on its face and was properly recorded.
Its invalidity arose from the existence of an agreement to reconvey, which agreement, as was previously stated, makes
an equitably mortgage out of the Investment Company's deed
which was fair on its face. Such agreement to reconvey,
however, not being recorded would render that deed a mort38
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gage only as against the parties having notice of the agreement to reconvey. A bona fide purchaser of the surface
rights in good faith for value, 'vhich Jay Larsen certainly was,
\Yould not be chargeable \vith any defect in the deed resulting
from the unrecorded instrument of which he had no knowledge.
Section 78-1-6, U.C.A., 1943 provides:
({Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument .of \vriting setting forth an agreement to convey
any real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate ·as notice to third persons shall be
proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of
the recorder of the county in which such real estate
is situated, but shall be valid and binding between
the parties thereto without such proof, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons
who have had actual notice."
In this case the deed was recorded, however the agreement to reconvey was not, and so while the agreement to
reconyey is binding as be tween the parties thereto and all
who had actual notice, it would not be binding t;lS between
the plaintiffs in this action and Jay Larsen.
Jones on Mortgages, Sec. 284, states:
HAn absolute deed with a defeasance passes the legal
. title to the property even in states where it is held
that a mortgage in the usual form does not pass the
title."
Therefore, the Van Kleecks, even though the deed 1s
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subject to an . unrecorded agreement to recovery, obtained
title to the property which they could pass to an innocent purchaser without notice. This exact situation is· discussed by
Glen or Mortgages, Sec. 10.1, where concerning the rights
of a bona fide purchaser, the author states:
((There are many possibilities in this regard, and
they are helped OJ.lt, in our country, by the recording
acts, of which we shall say more in a later chapter.
Typical for present purposes is the man who purchases land on the faith of a title that, .on .the face of
the record and for all he knows to the contrary, is
vested free and clear in his vendor. Such a ·person as
a bona fide purchaser is immune to the suit of a plaintiff who says that when he conveyed, the intention was
merely to secure a ·debt, and there was a defeasance
agreement to that effect, which for some reason was
not recorded. The defendant as a bona fide purchaser
is protected from the claim and the plaintiff must look
elsewhere for redress."
See also Meehan v. Forrester, 52 N. Y. 277 and Mooney v.
Byrne, 57 N.Y. 163.

•

In th~ case of Wiese v. Wiese, 217 Pac. 994, the Supreme
Court of Washington stated:
tlf the deed be regarded as a mortgage as between
the plaintiffs and the defendants, the sale of the land
by the plaintiffs to a bona fide purchaser vested good
title in them because of their being innocent putchasers. "
t

Therefore, although the plaintiffs were entitled to a
decree quieting title in them as against any interest in the
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property still remaining in the Van Kleeck companies, they
\vould not be entitled to have a decree binding upon any
bona fide purchasers to whom the Van Kleecks had conveyed.
In this category is Jay Larsen. The plaintiffs were not entitled
to and sought no relief as against Jay Larsen.
Section 104-57-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides
in regard to default judgment and quiet title action as follows:
ctThe judgment shall be conclusive against all the
persons named in the summons and complaint who
have been served-and against all such unknown persons as stated in the complaint and summons who
have been served by publication."
This section clearly recognizes the fact that in quiet title
actions there may be individuals having claims to the property
who are not named as parties, or who have not been served
in the action. Such, however, does not defeat the right of the
plaintiff to have the title determined by a default judgment
as between himself and the parties properly named and servedin the action. There is a vast difference between an action
broiight to reform an instrument of title and an action to
quiet title. An action to reform an instrument of title would,
of course, effect the rights of all persons claiming under such
instrument of title, and they would be necessary parties. All
of the cases cited by the defendants in their brief are cases of
this type, as will be hereinafter pointed out. On the other hand,
an action to quiet title does not ask for the changing of any
instrument of record, but merely asks for the determination
of the title as between the plaintiffs and the defendants named
and served.
41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This rule is clearly stated in the Alabama case of Dake v.
Inglis, 194 So. 673:
llThe purpose of the proceeding is not to invest the
Court with jurisdiction to sell or dispose of the title
to the land, but merely to determine and settle the
same as between the complainant and defendants.
Therefore, the fact that there are others who might
assert claims to the propery, who are not made parties,
is not an obstacle to a final decree settling the title
as between the parties to the bill. The decree is only
conclusive against such as are made parties and their
privies."
Similar language is found _in the Florida case of Brooks
v. Pryor, 189 So. 675, where an objection similar to the one
in this case was made:
lllt is next contested by counsel for appellant that
it appears upon the record that interested parties in
the subject matter of the litigation were not served with
process and should be made parties before a final
decree was entered * * * * The answer to this contention is that the bill of complaint is one to quiet
title and confirm title in the plaintiffs below and it is
not a suit to reform a ~eed because of a mistake in
the description of the lands ~onveyed.''
The decree in this action casts no cloud upon Jay Larsen's
title. The deed from the Warrs to the Van Kleeck companies
still stands unchanged upon the records. The decree in this
action merely determined that as between the parties to this
action, such deed was not a deed absolute, but an equitable
mortgage.
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Let us examine the cases cited by the defendants in support of their _position that the judgment constitutes a cloud
on Jay Larsen, s title and that he is therefore an indispensable
party. The first case cited by the defendants, Shields v.
Barrow, 17 How. 130, was not a quiet title action at all, but
a suit to rescind a contract. Certainly parties to the contract
\vhose rights would have been affected by the recision were not
parties to the action, and the Court therefore held a misjoinder.
United States v. Central Pacific R. Co., 11 Fed. 449, also
cited by the defendants was an action to vacate a patent
issued by the United States Government. A grantee of the
patentee was not made a party and the court held a misjoinder
for the reason that a va<;ating of the patent would leave such
grantee without any basis for his title.
As has been pointed out above, there is no effort made in
the quiet title action now before the Court to vacate or remove
from the record the W arr to Van Kleeck deed through which
Jay Larsen claims his title. The same is true of New Mexico
v. Lane, 243 U. S. 53,, where the action seeks to restrain the
issuance of a patent, which if not issued would have left
keepers title without a basis.
In South Penn Oil Co. v. Miller, 175 Fed. 729, there
was an action to gain possession of an oil well and dispose
of the lease monies thereunder to which monies a person not
a party to the action had a claim of right. Obviously in that
case the monies could not be property distributed without
having all parties before the Court.
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United States v. Bean, 25 3 Fed. 1, held that a purchaser
of a tax sale was an indispensable party in an action to annul
such tax sale as the annullment of the sale would leave his
title without any legal support.
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Hofstater, 32 Fed. (2) 184, is
a suit to enjoin a trespass and in that case it was held that
a prospective purchaser was not a party defendant.
Miller v. Klasner, 140 Pac. 1107, which the defendants
say is in point here, is decided on an entirely different point.
There it was decided that the defendant named was not a
real party in interest, but was merely an agent for Ellen Casey.
Furthermore the suit was not one to quiet title, but to restrain
the defendant from use of certain water. The Court held
that the real party in interest was not the agent who was made
defendant, but Ellen Casey, the defendant's principal. This
case has no application at all to the case now before the court.
In Vincent Oil Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 195 Fed. 434,
an action was brought to actually annul a lease under which a
person not made a party to the action claimed rights. There,
had the lease been annulled, this party would have lost all
its right and the Court properly held that such a party should
be entitled to defend.
Page v. Town of Gallup, 191 Pac. 460, and Egyptian
Novaculite Co. v. Stevenson, 8 Fed. (2) 576 (CCA 8), are
both cases where an attempt is made by a third party to annul
a contract between two parties where only one of the other
parties to the contract are made parties to the suit.
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Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 120, 8 S.W. 77, is an action
to cancel a deed on the records, while Iron City Sav. Bank·v.
Isaacsen, 164 S.E. 520, is a suit for an injunction to prevent
the transfer of water stock on the books of a company. · · ·
Here we are not making any attempt to upset. any recor~
title. The deed from W arrs to Van Kleecks will still remain
on the record. So Jar as the water stock is concerned, that: js
already ip~ Jay Lar~.en's -name on the books of the company
and no action is brought to change this record. .Once again
we repeat-if Jay Larsen's rights were actually b~ing affected
by this judgment then he w9uld perhaps be a necessa,ry party
to the suit. Whether >or not _l;le is a _permissif?le party,.,~n view
of the facts of the case, need not be here decided. It may ,
be that h~9- he applied in time, th~re. would be l).Othin.g wrong
in letting him enter the suit for the purpose of adjudi~ati~g
his rights. However, in ·view of the fact that· his rights are
not adversely affected by the decree, there is _no ,5:on~eivable
reason for upsetting the decree as between th.e plaintiff and
defendant for thepu~pose of merely l~tting Larsen .come into
the action.
·
'

' , ·

-

'

I

'

,

_.;_:

3
JAY LARSEN SHOULD NOT BEPERMITTEb.·to
INTERVENE.

(a) His Motion Was Not Timely.
The first appearance of. Jay Larsen in th~ case was·· on
~ay 23, 1952 when he filed a motion to set aside the, default
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and to be permitted to intervene. This occurred some 9 months
after the entry of th default judgment. We have ·already discussed in a preceding section of this brief the question of
what is a reasonable time in which ti file a motion to set aside
a default. The argument made there applies with equa~ force
to the motion of Jay Larsen. If persons desiring to intervene
in an action could fil~ a motion to have a judgment set aside
and permit them to intervene at any time, there could never be
a finality to any judgment. The losing party, in any law suit
could always, at any time, upset a judgment by finding a party
with some imagined interest in .the subject matter of a law
suit already determined and have such party file a motion to
intervene. Even if Jay Larsen had a right to intervene in this
action, which we will hereafter show he has not, he has not
acted promptly and his motion should be denied on that
ground alone.

(b) His Rights Are Not At Issue In This Action.
At the time of filing the complaint in this action, counsel
for the plaintiffs were well aware of the interest of Jay Larsen
in the subject matter of this law suit. We knew that he had
purchased the surface rights and had paid a consider~tion
therefor. There was nothing to indicate that Jay Larsen had
any knowledge of the existence of a reconveyance agreement.
It therefore appeared that Jay Larsen was clearly a purchaser
for value in good faith under a deed \vhich was in all respects
fair on its face. We ·felt, therefore, that so far as the surface
rights and the water stock were concerned, in fact so far as
anything that Jay Larsen purported to purchase, his right
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thereto \vas superior to the right of the Warrs. We felt that
there \vas no purpose in joining Jay Larsen in the suit. Our
sole purpose in th suit \Yas to try the issue of title as between
the \\Tarrs and the \'an Kleecks and to quiet title in the W arrs
as against the Van Kleecks. The law as it applies to the
relative rights of the Warrs and Jay Larsen has been previously
discussed. Jay Larsen's title is in exactly the same position as
it was before this action was commenced. He has in no way
been injured or prejudiced by the entry of the order in this
case.

(c) He Has Been Offered and Has Rejected All That He
Could Obtain In The Action.

Although it is clear that Jay Larsen has not been injured
m this action, . in order to emphasize their position in this
case and to clear up any possible question as to this matter,
during the hearing on the motion the plaintiffs in open court
offered to execute fo Jay Larsen a quit claim deed to the surface
rights of the land and the water stock. At this hearing, Larsen
was being represented by the same counsel representing the
Van Kleeck companies. Counsel refused to accept this quit
claim deed. This action clearly showed that Jay Larsen's appearance in this action is not a genuine and bona fide appearance. He is merely a party manufactured by counsel for the
VanKleeck companies and thrown in the case for the purpose
of muddying the waters. If Jay Larsen honestly feels that
there is any cloud on his title resulting from the judgment
of the plaintiffs, why would he not welcome a deed from the
plaintiffs in order to clear up this matter? The answer is
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t

obvious-neither the attorneys for Jay Larsen nor the attorneys
for Van Kleeck are one bit interested in the condition of Mr.
Larsen's title. They are interested merely in causing confusion
in the hope that it will lend weight to their attempt to set aside
the default as to the Van Kleeck companies.
As an excuse for refusing to accept the deed, they state
that there has been no probate· of the W arrs' estate and that
there may be persons with intervening interest. Of course,
that situation has not been changed at all by the action in
this case as none of these intervening interests have been in
any way litigated. The only persons that could obtain any
interest in the property as a result of the judgment in this law
suit are the plaintiffs herein. Any interest which they might
have obtained would be returned to Jay Larsen by the quit
claim deed. If Jay Larsen were permitted to intervene in the
action, he could get nothing more than a determination of his
title as bet~een himself and the plaintiffs in this action. The
decree could not determine his title as to persons not parties
hereto. · As all of the persons and the plaintiffs. in the action
have offered to quit claim to Larsen, he would get everything
by a quit claim deed that he could obtain by the most favorable
judgment that could be entered in his Javor if he were permitted to intervene.

IV
THE POSITION OF CARTER OIL COMPANY.
Carter Oil.Company stands in the same position as Jay
Larsen. This company took its lease on the property in ques48
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tion on the basis of a deed on record which was fair on its
face. This lease would therefore, under the authority cited
above, take preference over the claims of the plaintiffs in this
action. Regardless of what the relative rights of the plaintiffs
and defendants in this rna y be as to the proceeds of such
lease, the rights of Carter Oil Company under the lease are
not changed by the decree in this case. This would be so even
if the plaintiffs had not ratified the lease; however, in view
of the fact that plaintiffs have ratified the lease, the Carter
Oil Company does not stand to be hurt. The concern of the defendants in this action for the welfare of the Carter. Oil
Company would seem very amusing. Although Carter Oil Company has from the beginning had full knowledge of the facts of
this suit, it has not seen fit to attempt to intervene in defense of
its rights. The affidavit of Don Barr (R. 11) clearly shows that
Carter Oil Company knew of the judgment on or before
November 7, 1951. It also had constructive notice by the
recording of the Lis Pendens in June of 1951.

CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Trial Court denying the motion of
the defendants should be sustained. The rights of Jay Larsen
and Carter Oil Company are not at issue in this case at all..
They are merely matters thrown in by the Van Kleeck companies to confuse the issues. The sole questions before this
court are--Did the taking of the judgment result from surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect and if so, have the
Van Kleecks a meritorious defense? On the basis of the
/
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authorities above cited, both of these, questions
answered in the negative.

must be

Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON,
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg.,
~alt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
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